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Although emotions are linked to irrationality, a number of recent researches 
have shown emotions are central to political behaviour.  While as politics is an 
emotionally dense sphere of individual and collective action, any fuller 
comprehension of the political imaginary must ponder it. 
This paper considers the emotional dimension of the political imaginary 
according to a dual rhetorical instance: the use of emotions as tools (emotional 
appeals) to influence behaviour and thinking; and the very affective nature of 
politics as such. In other words, I will examine affects as rhetorical means and as 
structuring elements of the political imaginary. 
By referring to empirical political messages – from the Daisy Ad until the 
election of the comedian actor Volodymyr Zelensky as President of Ukraine - it 
is claimed that the political imaginary is not just about collective reasoning. The 
political imaginary is also something that we feel. This paper intends to clarify 
how affects help to determine collective feeling and, consequently, political 
decision making and social understanding
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1. Introduction 
 
Traditionally, emotions have been separated out from politics. In fact, emotions have 
had only a shadow existence with no place in the rational models of political theory 
(Goodwin et al. 2001, p.1). With exception of a few philosophers such as Aristotle and 
Spinoza, social scientists emphasized the political process as an almost mechanical 
processing of symbols, tending to ignore the role of passions in political life. Max 
Weber, for instance, associated emotions with irrationality:  
 
“The more we ourselves are susceptible to such emotional reactions as anxiety, anger, 
ambition, envy, jealousy, love, enthusiasm, pride, vengefulness, loyalty, devotion, and 
appetites of all sorts, and to the ‘irrational’ conduct which grows out of them, the more 
readily we can empathize with them. . . . For the purposes of a typological scientific 
analysis it is convenient to treat all irrational, affectual determined elements of behaviour as 
factors of deviation from a conceptually pure type of rational action” (Weber 1978, p.6). 
 
Twentieth century crowd psychology, such as found in Le Bon and Tarde’s works, 
acknowledged the passional dimension discerned in social movements in the idea of 
“group mind” and “contagion of feelings”.  However, crowds were considered atypical 
political manifestations that short-circuited symbolic communication since participants 
were seen as directly responding to each other’s physical actions (driven by rumours, 
anxiety, fear or excitement).  
Following this tradition, most studies of political decision-making treat emotions as 
a nuisance (Sears 2000; Marcus 2000) - although political scientists have recognized 
both substantive and emotional contents of key importance in the effects of campaign 
advertising on voters (Ridout and Searles 2011), and on behaviour and attitudes 
(Lodge and Taber 2005). Indeed, a growing number of studies brought to light how of 
processes of interaction and negotiation, shared cultural meanings and social networks 
are driven by emotions. Consequently, emotions must be integrated in a general 
sociological perspective in order to reveal the social nature of human emotions, as well 
as the emotional nature of social phenomena and politics (Bericat 2015). Understanding 
how emotions interfere with and constitute the political process means we first need to 
understand the social situation that produces it. So, to study emotions in politics 
involves examining the social nature of emotions and the emotional nature of social 
reality. Collective phenomena in which passions perform a central role such as 
festivals, sporting events, political revolutions and protests, need to be appraised by 
exposing their affective structures and emotional dynamics (Bericat 2015, p.7).  
For this reason, we need to consider the political imaginary. The political imaginary 
is a sub-set of a social imaginary - which envelops all the mental, philosophical and 
cultural realities of a society. It encompasses the social representations and may be 
described as a set of values, institutions, symbols, narratives, images and myths 
publicly available to individual and collective use. Since it encapsulates a 
 
 
Number 14 – Year VIII / December 2019         www.imagojournal.it 
      imagojournal.it    
 
 
287 
 
Samuel Mateus 
The Double Instance of the Political Imaginary 
 
communicative mediation between the real and the imagined, theory and practice, the 
material and the symbolic, the imaginary is always crossed by a primordial tension 
between emotion and reason. The Imaginary and the Real are, thus, not separate and 
independent entities. They are not dichotomous elements. Instead, every imaginary is 
real and every reality is imagined. To Durand (1960), existence is always situated in 
this interbreed realm of the imaginary.  
The imaginary can assume the role of a semantic basin to all human expressions. 
But, most important from a political standpoint, the imaginary is also a force and a 
social catalyst that unites peoples in tribes and groups (Maffesoli 1991). It forms a 
coordinated background of symbolic representations from which societies constitute 
themselves. It is also the manifestation of a collective aesthesis and of the sensible that 
expresses social cohesion. Hence, the political imaginary is mainly felt as a pure 
emotion (Maffesoli 1995). It is not just ideas and beliefs; it also sentiments and feelings 
that structure collective identity.  
This paper describes the affective nature of the political imaginary. For its purposes, 
it will take emotions and affects as interchangeable notions (Glaser and Salovey, 1998). 
Affect is not related to the Affective Turn (Clough and Halley 2007) or Affect in 
Philosophical terms (Massumi 2015). Affects are here simply understood as a general 
framework from which specific emotions emerge. They form clusters that organize 
emotional dispositions. The paper adopts a perspective on the affective structures and 
emotional dynamics of the political imaginary based on a cultural approach. This 
means that emotions are understood as not just biological responses but social 
constructed feelings emerging in the socialization process. Societies possess an 
emotional culture and vocabulary (Bericat 2015, p.9) that define what should be felt 
and how it should be expressed. This is why examining the political imaginary from an 
affective standpoint is so important. It recognizes the cultural matrix in which affects 
emerge and address social shared patterns of interaction. Failing to focus on this 
cultural matrix of the affective dimension of the political imaginary is to fail to 
acknowledge how emotional cultures and societal emotions inhabit and configure 
politics.  
In what follows, a brief description of the link between emotions and the political 
imaginary is made, followed by an assessment of the emotionally loaded rhetoric of the 
political imaginary by looking into some of the most iconic examples of 20 and 21th 
century political communication. 
 
 
2. The Political Imaginary and its Emotional Density 
 
The reality of everyday life appears to the self as an intersubjective world, a world 
that is communicatively shared with others. It is taken for granted as reality (Berger 
and Luckman 1967, p.36). However, the reality of everyday life is not exhausted by the 
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immediate presence of phenomena, here and now. There are several degrees of 
closeness and remoteness, both spatially and temporally, that impose the transition 
from the paramount reality to the finite provinces of meaning (Berger and Luckman 
1967, p.39).  
The social imaginaries provide the symbolic richness that nourishes those finite 
provinces of meaning. A social imaginary is a socially constructed scheme that enables 
us to understand something as real, explain it and intervene operatively in what we 
think as our reality (Pintos 2000). 
The political imaginary can be seen as a specific division of the social imaginary that 
bind individuals by a sense of solidarity, and it suggests bonds of trust, loyalty but also 
of affection and synchronous vibrancy. The political imaginary is thus composed of 
intellectual symbols but also of affective symbols and features in which cognition and 
affect intermix. The national anthem is not just the narrative of the nation; it is likewise 
a shared patriotic feeling of nationhood that plays a significant role in the preservation 
of collective identity. Patriotism may, indeed, have affective as well cognitive 
orientations (Schatz, Staub and Lavine 1999).  
The political imaginary is not solely expressed by ideologies and utopias but also by 
myths, allegories and rituals based on emotional contagion. It is an emotionally dense 
phenomenon that brings feelings of group solidarity, pumps emotional energy and 
extrapolates collective participation. 
The political imaginary is, therefore, explained in similar terms of Durkheim’s 
collective effervescence (Durkheim 1965). Just as Durkheim emphasized ritual as the 
operating function of emotional effervescence (in which the symbols of the group are 
brought forward as catalyst of collective attention and communion), we can identify 
emotional transformation as the operating function of the political imaginary. 
Emotional sharing may be understood as the motor of social belonging as it amplifies 
emotional experiences (for example, anger against a policy, mistrust and disdain 
against a politician, pity for a victim). 
On the one hand, this means that we should include affection parallel to cognition. 
On the other, this too means that emotions present a cognitive side. Political 
ceremonies, commemorations, homages, and other ritual events are just as 
representational as they are performative. They are arenas of identity through which 
meaning is conveyed.  
Also, emotional appeals may be apprehended as a vehicle of emotional, non-
rational learning. Non-discursive elements of aesthetic emotion are, in this case, 
paramount elements that counter or reinforce discursive elements such as political 
ideology and ideological worldviews (Berezin 2001, p.93). So, there is no cognition 
versus affection dichotomy. They both work on the political imaginary at different 
levels: the intellectual side and the sensible one.  
Parallel to ideologies and political programs, there is panoply of integrated symbols 
and affections that lead the political process. Most contemporary research on political 
psychology indicates some influence of affects on political judgement (Glaser and 
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Salovey 1998, p.161; Marcus 2000) and even that affect is a powerful predictor of 
electoral choice, more than “purely” cognitive appraisals (Marcus 1988).  
Marcus (1988) suggests candidates might do well by concentring on emotional 
appeals than to focus on issue-oriented campaigns. Other studies claim that people 
tend to respond to political issues with an affective (kind of gut) reaction, rather than in 
rational manner (Kuklinski, Luskin and Bolland 1991). More than a few scholars and 
political commentators attributed to affective reactions the popularity of former US 
President Ronald Reagan. This could explain the discrepancies between public opinion 
and the overall evaluation of Reagan as a politician (Glaser and Salovey 2001, p.161). 
One study made by Halberstadt and Niedenthal (1997) even showed that persons 
attending to emotionally rich stimuli can extract more information than people in 
impoverished circumstances, suggesting that emotional evaluations may have greater 
importance than “strictly” cognitive ones. This all points to the idea that affect reaction 
mediate judgement making emotions not just a fundamental element of politics but 
also of the political imaginary. 
As privileged forms of felt identities, political affects are not irrational. In fact, 
affects are the very logic of politics and one of the very core aspects of the political 
imaginary. As Slaby and Bens (2019, p.340) remark: 
 
All political practices are affective. Political action and its institutional and organizational 
architectures are embedded in and productive of affective dynamics. At the same time, 
political practices and institutions are dependent on specific forms of affectivity, which may 
crystallize into prevailing sentiments and emotional orientations. 
 
Henceforth, the political imaginary is inhabited by emotions but also operates in the 
transformation of emotions into something else (Collins 2001, p.29): a form of public 
consciousness that focus collective attention on the basis of emotional interpretations of 
the reality (for example, where the collision of two airplanes became the catalyst to 
USA’s “war on terror”).  
The political imaginary is nourished by this double operation: by one hand, it 
supplies the emotional feeling with its aesthetic experience of the sensible; by other 
hand, it addresses the political use of emotions as justifications to political actions. 
While the former indicates an affective political imaginary, the latter designates the 
affects in politics (Slaby and Bens, 2019, p.341). Affect in politics deals with the regulated 
sphere of collective action and how emotions and affects regulate, alter and confront 
everyday political practices. 
The political imaginary is made of these two distinct issues: how affects inhabit 
political understanding of the social world; and how affects are used to configure 
political praxis. In this second case, affects are a means to governance and political 
negotiation (functioning as fuel to resistance or to conformist actions). In the first case, 
affects are themselves structures of the political imaginary. 
Within this twofold process, the political imaginary distributes identities, expresses 
social needs and establish the goals to be reached. Through the shared feeling of 
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politics cognitive complexity is reduced and tuned to a common note. Because politics 
is always an unfinished narrative with continuing images and rituals abundantly 
invoked, the political imaginary is also a network of shared sensations, common 
feelings, sensible and emotional experiences. The political imaginary, in this regard, is 
a fundamental pillar of the communities of feeling in which modern nation-states serve 
as vehicles of political emotion and in which citizenship is felt identity (Berezin 2001, 
p.86). 
 
“Citizenship is far from a formal, criteria-based mode of allegiance but a thoroughly 
affective affair” (Slaby and Bens 2019, p.348). 
 
The political imaginary is emotionally dense: the double movement around affective 
politics and affect in politics puts a strong emphasis on a complex core of emotions ruling 
political understanding. Emotion is, indeed, one of the pivots upon which the political 
imaginary turns. The vocabulary of sentiment - such as the thrill of risk, the despair of 
loss or the joy of triumph - are not banal and empty emotions. On the contrary, they 
are the ways individuals are put together and politics is exercised. 
 
 
3. Affects as Rhetorical Means and Structures of the Political Imaginary. 
 
After political affectivity (Clarke, Hoggett and Thompson 2006; Protevi 2009) has 
been established, this section will draw on some examples illustrating the affective 
political imaginary. 
 In the first part, it will illustrate the political use of emotions. In the second, it will 
examine the emotional nature of the political imaginary. Both presuppose an affective 
rhetoric (Mateus 2018). Indeed, rhetoric is absolutely central in deliberative democracy 
and modern politics. 
 
Rhetoric facilitates the making and hearing of representation claims spanning subjects and 
audiences divided in their commitments and dispositions. Deliberative democracy requires 
a deliberative system with multiple components whose linkage often needs rhetoric. 
(Dryzek 2010, p.1) 
 
However, while in the first dimension concerns mainly (verbal, visual and sound) 
emotional appeals, the second dimension points to the very emotional structuring of 
political action. Each of these parts concerns, therefore, the double movement of the 
emotionally dense political imaginary mentioned earlier: affects as means of political 
discourse; and affects as structuring elements of the political imaginary. 
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3.1 Affects as Means 
 
Let us start by considering emotions as tools of political discourse. In such a case, 
we are dealing with social uses of emotions (and emotional appeals) in order to 
enhance political success and impact public opinion. Emotions are taken as a kind of 
performative tool (Cislaru 2012, p.107) that sustains politics while generating political 
power. Elections, wars, catastrophes, crises, attacks and accidents are examples of 
events in which the emotions encounter a fertile ground to prosper.  
Media have a special role in propagating images, ideas, narratives based on 
emotions such as danger, fear, anxiety, terror or even euphoria and delirium. Populist 
political discourse, such as the one re-emerging in the 21th century, is specially 
emotionally oriented (Charadeau 2008). Those leaders are associated with inflamed 
speeches, full of invectives and moral evaluations that are super-loaded with emotional 
charge. It is easy to find examples on media discourse where words are provocative 
and emotional such as “Scandalous Decision”, “Disgraceful Action”, “Unacceptable”, 
“Shameful”, “Insulting” or “Offending”.  
Since the political imaginary (including slogans, social manifestations, political 
cartoons, memes and social networks hashtags) is impregnated with these emotionally-
charged discourses, it is now very difficult to accept that citizens act solely based on 
the cold, rational consideration of non-emotionally charged information (Glaser and 
Salovey 1998, p.156). The 2018 Brazilian presidential election of Bolsonaro, for example, 
has been linked with such an emotionally charged discourse propagated in digital 
media (such as WhatsApp) that provides us with a good example of the relevance of 
emotions in today’s political imaginary. 
 
From analysing links to news sources and random sample of images and videos we found 
that: (1) In Brazil, WhatsApp presents an extremely low number of professional political 
content and a high number of junk news content; (2) Information spreading on WhatsApp 
relies intensely on the dissemination media files, which don’t use the same rhetoric as junk 
news sources, not attempting to simulate authority to credit information; (3) Content 
dissemination strategies within WhatsApp groups often resort to hate speech and deception 
to achieve viral dissemination.(Machado et ali. 2019, p.1017). 
   
 
 
But emotions as tools do not revolve solely around verbal communication. Non-
verbal communications such as body language and physical appearance also subsidize 
the political imaginary. Recent research has consistently shown that a candidate’s 
image (including physical appearance and expressiveness) influence voter choices. A 
politician’s attractiveness, facial expressions, voice and general attitudes have been 
linked to a more or less trustworthy evaluation influencing also the competency 
appraisal (Rosenberg et ali, 1991). Even candidates who speak more optimistically have 
greater chances of success (Glaser and Salovey 1998, p.158). One may, thus, say that 
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politics concedes to citizens’ feelings a major political decision-making role that is not 
possible to detach from rational arguments and ideological constructs. Reason and 
emotion, ideology and affective political praxis, are two sides of the same coin. 
Therefore, the political imaginary is colonised by both logics: non-emotional and 
emotional communication. 
The “affective congruence hypothesis” is a good illustration of this. It posits the 
mood will influence the receptivity of the political message predicting that citizen’s 
mood match with the affective tone of the message will determine citizen’s receptivity 
to that message (Niedenthal et ali. 1997). This suggests that citizens feeling angry with a 
given situation reacted best to political appeals based on an angry tone. Interestingly, 
fearful citizens on a given topic (such as a nuclear war) seem to respond most 
favourably to hopeful discourses (Glaser and Salovey 1998, p.160).  
Emotional rhetorical appeals have been widely used in politics around the globe 
and are a key aspect of mediated political campaigning. The political imaginary is 
immersed in this productive use of emotions as a means to influence decision-making. 
These are just a few examples. 
One of the classic cases is the “Daisy Ad” of 1964 US presidential campaign in 
which the terrifying nature of images of nuclear explosions are contraposed to images 
of a small innocent girl. This ad aims to produce emotions in voters in order to 
facilitate a political decision in favour of Lyndon Johnson. Anxiety seems here the 
fundamental emotional trigger that is intended to determine the political evaluation of 
the candidate. There is no long speech accusing the rival of potentially leading us to 
extinction. In just 90 seconds, the “Daisy Ad” established a very clear path to political 
decision making through the strategic use of emotions. Anxiety is, in this case, linked 
to fear and its consequences: withdrawal, risk aversion or avoidance behaviours. By 
focusing on a concrete threat (nuclear power), the ad drives voters against Goldwater 
stimulating increased attention to campaign information (Searles and Ridout 2017). 
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Figure 1 – Daisy Advert (1964) 
 
But it is not just fear and anxiety that are abundant within today’s political 
imaginary. Reagan’s 1984 ad “Morning in America” or Obama’s 2008 presidential 
campaign are both based on engendering feelings of hope what also has been shown to 
increase news consumption on that candidate (Just et ali. apud Searles and Ridout 2017). 
It is even pointed out that positive emotional arousal such as hope play a significant 
role in political decision-making (Belt et ali. apud Searles and Ridout 2017).  
Another example of the use of hope is Clinton’s 1992 “The Man from Hope” video. 
Firstly, shown at the 1992 democratic convention, the VHS video is a biographical 
portrait of Bill Clinton including reminisces on his childhood experiences and his early 
political career. It is based on Hope Arkansas, a small city and hometown of the 
candidate. But it is also based on the idea of changing the future by appealing to hope. 
One of the last sentences is: “I still believe in the promise of America, and I still believe 
in a place called Hope.” While there are references to sadness (he never got to know his 
father), the chosen emotion to perform the political message is precisely hopefulness 
(and faith) - a state of arousal that will hopefully persuade citizens to vote in him.  
Discrete emotions are, then, frequent in political messages and may function as 
emotional stimuli and tools to political efficiency and persuasion. 
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Figure 2 – Man From Hope (1992) 
Curiously, and despite its anger-based rhetoric, 2016 presidential candidate Donald 
Trump registers 45.5 % of his political ads as alluding and referring to hope (Searles 
and Ridout 2017). This is easily understandable if one has in mind his slogan: “Make 
America Great Again!” The hope encapsulated in the slogan is succinctly described as 
making references to the ways Trump would restore (the allegedly disappeared) 
greatness of US while changing the political system. This is an emotionally charged 
message, where hope resides in his capacity to bring about change for the better in a 
near future. The slogan is, thus, also a promise and demand of trust without which the 
promised change would never be accomplished.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Trump’s slogan (2016) 
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These examples illustrate the use of emotions in political discourse. More, all of 
these emotions are subject to different kinds of discourse: verbal discourses but also 
visual discourse (two films and one print advertising). For this reason, they are 
relevant cases where it is possible to see the political imaginary being inundated with 
symbols and feelings that instil an aesthetic and sensible way of thinking politics. 
 
3.2 Affects as structural elements 
 
In this way of conceiving emotions on politics, they are not means to an end (eg. 
instil trust in order to influence voting). Instead of focusing on rhetorical strategies 
adopted by social movements (Chavez 2011) or on formal communication across 
parliamentary debates and political campaigns, we are re-focusing into the very 
affective core of political rhetoric. The political imaginary’s affective rhetoric lies at a 
deeper, structuring level.  
In this case, rhetoric is not applied to a given topic (climate change, terrorism, 
personal authenticity, etc). We are dealing with a fundamental layer of the political 
imaginary that is basically and primordially impacted by affects - and from which 
emotions derive. They are not a product of strategic rhetoric (for instance, political 
ambiguity may be intentional (Condor et ali. 2019, p.36)).  
As we have seen, emotions are complete elements of politics, as rhetorical appeals, 
or as fundamental elements that mediate collective life as Durkheim (1965) showed. A 
key aspect of the political imaginary is an affective rhetoric “grounded in theories of 
affect that recognize the bodily, visceral response to signs and images that preserves 
but exceeds their symbolic or referential value” (Zappen 2016, p.1). It is a kind of 
(affective) energy in excess and beyond symbolic and referential meanings. Affective 
rhetoric encompasses both the symbolic and affective ways by which people are united 
with (and therefore) divided from one another including textual but also bodily 
representations.  
It is this very characteristic that puts affective rhetoric as a key notion of the political 
imaginary. By encompassing both symbolic and non-symbolic, real and imagined, 
intellectual or emotional reasonings the imaginary rests on the affective rhetoric to 
make it visible. Because the imaginary is not just worldviews but also common feeling: 
it is speech but also intonation; it uses argument and formal logic but also draws on 
preference and empathy, in word and (communicative) silence. 
Speaking of “affective rhetoric” as an event, we are not just referencing appeals to 
emotions as extensively studied by argumentation theory but, above all, that affective 
energy circulates among signs, images, sounds and communities. Affective rhetoric is 
about the social mobilization of affects and how they lead to rhetorical persuasion 
(Mateus 2018). It is about the predominance of the rhetorical pathos over logos and ethos. 
In the case of social imaginaries, considering an affective rhetoric is useful since it 
studies how affects (including passions, moods, feelings, or sentiments) are socially 
and culturally deployed in the manifold manifestations of the political imaginary. The 
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affective moment entails a kind of rhetoric magma that conduces the way and think 
and feel politics through its many forms (symbolically or sensibly), genres (humor, 
formal addresses or ceremonial events) and multimodality (visual, verbal, etc). 
Politics is always pre-configured in terms of affects (that bring closer or that push 
further away) including a diversity of expressions such as violent protests, homages of 
tragic events or political campaigning in popular street-encounters with citizens, where 
kissing is frequent. This primitive form of emotional arousal is essential to the very 
exercise of political campaigning and it includes hand shaking and collective cheers. 
Affects res structural elements of political rhetoric in all its multimodal semiotic forms: 
from assembly speeches, to activism songs to symbolic acts such as vigils. Before the 
actualization of emotions in a given context with rhetorical intent, there is a more 
hidden and visceral layer of affects structuring and organizing political action.  
Of course, above all, political campaigns are about policy debates and political 
deliberation. But, from the start, the political imaginary sets them in affective terms. 
Discourses shape the way we see the world. Symbols, of course, are crucial to that 
endeavor. But so they are affects. As social beings, we communicate by feeling the 
symbols. The social imaginary is felt communion by affects that shape collective 
understanding of symbols. So, ideological programs are also felt and emotionally 
understood. So, affects structure the political imaginary. They are not just another layer 
of meaning but, given the close association between reason and emotion, affects are 
constitutive forms of both the real and the imagined. 
One example: fiction TV series “The Simpsons” (Season 11, episode 17) 
“predicted” 15 years before Trump would be elected President of the United States. Of 
course, the screenwriters did not foresee the future. But this is a good example of the 
difficulty to distinguish the real and the imagined. It is also an opportunity to confirm 
how emotions permeate the imaginary. At the time, that could be understood as 
sarcasm or ridicule; but in the present time is now an illustration of the fusion between 
the imaginary and the real. Emotional reactions of laughter and joy soon became 
emotional reactions of bewilderment. As quickly as this was put into circulation in 
news and social media, the hypothetical became a certainty and the North-American 
imaginary was flooded with allusions between fiction and reality, television and 
reality. The political imaginary is thus influenced by the media imaginary and the basic 
emotions of the audience are transferred into the basic emotions of citizens (and 
voters). To many political commentators, the hilarious prediction of “The Simpsons” 
became the tragic reality. 
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Figure 3 – Comparing fiction and reality in “The Simpsons” 
 
We find a comparable example on the recent election of the Ukrainian President 
Volodymyr Zelensky that brought to politics a non-verbal vocabulary of comedy. 
Zelensky is a comedic actor who, prior to the election, entered in the houses of 
Ukrainian citizens through a fictional television program where he played precisely the 
role of the Ukraine’s President. People got used to his presence as a fictional character, 
and the potential positive emotions toward his fictional character had quickly 
transformed fiction into reality. The country’s political imaginary was soon colonised 
by this mixture of man and character. Political commentators, without hesitation, 
described his political candidacy as a joke. But once again laughs turned into effective 
affective instances that, ultimately, helped to elect Zelensky. His political experience 
was limited to his acting as President on a television show. He was a newcomer on 
politics that capitalized an affective rhetoric- based on the everyday familiarity of a 
television character- that convinced voters. His debate with Poroshenko was even 
described in terms of a boxing match and it was staged as a television spectacle. We 
see, then, how the political imaginary acquires an almost entertaining , where 
expressions such as “fake candidate”, “dramatic entrance” and “know-out blow” 
entered with ease1.  
 
 
                                               
1 One such example is the Independent news: “Comedian Zelensky faces down Petro Poroshenko in fiery 
Ukrainian presidential debate: “I’m not your opponent, I’m your sentence”, accessed at 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-election-latest-volodymyr-zelensky-
petro-poroshenko-debate-comedian-vote-a8878716.html 
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His body language, besides, mirrors juvenile manifestations that are frequently 
observed in mass musical concerts. He introduced a repertoire of gestures that are not 
part of the traditional non-verbal vocabulary of politics. This facilitated the replication 
of elements, gestures and messages of the entertainment and media imaginary into the 
political imaginary. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Non-verbal communication of Zelensky  
 
These two examples are, of course, not exhaustive but they should give us a fair 
idea of how politics is much more than rational argumentation and how it has become 
inhabited by an affective rhetoric (verbal and non-verbal) where emotions play a 
major, structuring role in the way we see the political process. Both cases go beyond 
the mere verbal rhetorical discourse and point to a political process envisaged as an 
imagined and fictional world that becomes real; or, on the other hand, a political 
process envisaged as reality that seems fiction.  
Nevertheless, emotions of amazement and bewilderment are here crucial to 
understand how amusing (and emotional) the political imaginary has become. The 
affects are here mobilizing not so much emotional appeals but a substrate layer upon 
which political practice is accomplished. This layer crosses the real and the imaginary, 
the intellectual and the sensible, reason and emotion. The political imaginary resonates 
these very aspects of politics, as 21th century examples demonstrate.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
Emotions are essential elements to understanding politics. Therefore, the political 
imaginary cannot be apprehended without contemplating their role on political 
decision-making, voter behaviour and collective experience. In this paper, it was 
proposed to look into the emotional dimension of the political imaginary according to 
a double instance: the use of emotions as tools (emotional appeals) to influence 
behaviour and thinking; and the very affective nature of politics.  
By taking into consideration both instances, we recognize that emotions lie at the 
very core of the political imaginary. The distinction here introduced helps to separate 
two functioning regimes of an emotion-determined political imaginary in which 
ideologies and sentiments, rational reasoning and mood, as well as speech and non-
verbal communication, decisively contribute to configure the affective contours of the 
political imaginary’s symbols, rituals and emblematic images. As politics is not just 
about information-processing, the political imaginary is not just about collective (and 
discursive) reasoning. Politics is also felt; and understanding how we feel the political 
imaginary is what this paper is about. Affective energies permeate the political 
imaginary. As a semantic basin to all human expressions, it is also a concrete and 
imagined emotional resonance. The political imaginary enlightens the mind while, at 
the same time, it puts them into a common vibrancy and emotional arrangement.  
 
“The political is the sphere where human individuals and collectives determine – either 
jointly or adversely – what their finite earthly existence will ultimately look like: the how of 
their living together and relating to one another” (Slaby and Bens 2018, p.349). 
 
Following this idea, one could add that the political is where human individuals 
and collectives determine how they feel their living together through an imaginary 
where reason and emotion are combined together. Providing an account of the 
affective life of politics is, hence, a fundamental task future research may certainly 
answer.  
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